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State Collapse, Democratisation and Informal Power in Iraq Freedom's untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things and that's what's going to happen here.* A legacy of Saddam Hussein's rule was that every Iraqi male knew how to use a gun. † In his last hours as US proconsul in Baghdad in the summer of 2004, Paul Bremer decided to tighten up some of the laws that his occupation authority had placed across the land of Iraq. He drafted a new piece of legislation, forbidding Iraqi motorists to drive with only one hand on the wheel. Another document solemnly announced that it would henceforth be a crime for Iraqis to sound their car horns except in an emergency. That same day, while Bremer fretted about the standards of Iraqi driving, three American soldiers were torn apart by a roadside bomb north of Baghdad, one of more than sixty attacks on US forces over the same weekend. It would be difficult to find a more preposterous -and distressing -symbol of Bremer's failures, his hopeless inability to understand the nature of the debacle which he and his hopeless occupation authority had brought about. ‡ Huge crimes, assassinations, beheadings. Why only today I dissected three beheaded bodies. We will probably break the record for beheaded cadavers in any forensic department in the world. §
Introduction
When we speak of 'Iraq' certain words or terms spring to mind: anarchy, lawlessness, violence, sectarianism, bodycount or Hobbesian 'war of all against all'.
1 However political violence and crime in Iraq adhered to clear rules of social logic. The 'war of all against all' did not occur.
2 Authority did appear quite quickly but from multiple places. The sources of power included the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in the Green Zone then, following the transfer of power, the weak Iraqi government, Shia militias, Sunni militias and rejuvenated tribal authority. In part Iraq began to resemble African 'warlord' states as documented by Reno and de Waal in which the violence followed clear lines of rationality since the 'market' for conflict resolution was skewed against making a permanent deal. 3 The statelet with the most coercive force in Iraq was the CPA government, in operation from 2003-04, and its successor the Iraqi government (heavily influenced by the US as a form of shadow government). Using the US military it intimidated the Mehdi Army, faced down the insurgents in Falluja in 2004 and effectively terminated al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a threat to the state in 2007-08 (after thinking politically and co-opting local forces). But from the start it never had a monopoly of violence and it could not provide public security and basic services. As most observers have pointed out this was central to subsequent political development in Iraq. We can pose the question: what would Iraq look like today if the Iraqi army and police had not disintegrated and the US had had 400,000 troops to man the occupation instead of 170,000? Iraq would certainly have displayed serious social and political instability but it would not have been as chaotic, and this tells us what we need to know about state power and historical analysis. Despite some analysts drawing on the Saddam period to explain sectarian violence or the rise of organised crime, it is the period after 2003 that is in fact central to explaining disorder and crime. As Braudel shows us, historical as opposed to chronological time moves at very different speeds. After Saddam there was a compressed period of intense social change in Iraq and it is this fundamental and rapidly changing context which explains political violence and crime. Pre-existing features were of course important but the sectarian split between Shia and Sunni was not a transhistorical struggle waiting to happen. 4 Religious militias became dominant because during the instability after 2003 their model of social dominance came from the marginally better organisation of the Sadrist's and the arrival of foreign actors (al Qaeda in Iraq, the Badr brigade) who became the leading edge of social development.
Thus, although experts on Iraq have stated that Saddam's rule had eradicated civil society, almost immediately after 2003 it was clear that civil society was quite robust, particularly if we accept that it is not merely composed of progressive groups approved of by Western aid donors.
5 A plethora of movements emerged (such as the Sunni resistance in the socalled Sunni Triangle), or rapidly expanded (Muqtada al Sadr and the Medhi Army militia), or arrived from abroad (the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Badr Brigade). Secular groups also developed and, even as violence accelerated, campaign groups appeared to try and protect women's rights and secularism. However, secular civil
